The Judiciary As Political Stepping-Stone: The Case for More Temperate Debate by Titone, Vito J.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 12 
Issue 1 Volume 12, Fall 1996, Issue 1 Article 3 
September 1996 
The Judiciary As Political Stepping-Stone: The Case for More 
Temperate Debate 
Vito J. Titone 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Titone, Vito J. (1996) "The Judiciary As Political Stepping-Stone: The Case for More Temperate Debate," 
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol12/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE JUDICIARY AS POLITICAL STEPPING-
STONE: THE CASE FOR MORE
TEMPERATE DEBATE*
HONORABLE VITO J. TITONE**
So much has changed in the forty years since I and the rest of
the Class of 1956 were handed our diplomas and sent out into the
world to make our individual marks. We have gone from the im-
aginative space flights of H.G. Welles' fiction' to live broadcasts
from real floating space shuttles. We have gone from manual
typewriters, mimeograph machines, and telegrams to word
processors, fax machines, e-mail, and cellular phones. We have
gone from a world in which most lawyers, doctors, and account-
ants were white males to a world in which women and people of
color represent a substantial part of these professions.2
Even the location of this law school has changed. When the
Class of 1956 graduated, St. John's Law School consisted of a
building in downtown Brooklyn. Now, thanks to the generosity of
its benefactors, this school is housed in a modem, state-of-the-art
building in Jamaica Estates.
* Remarks made at the 1996 Homecoming at St. John's University School of Law,
Jamaica, New York on October 26, 1996.
** New York State Court of Appeals Associate Judge Vito J. Titone received his Bachelor
of Arts degree from New York University in 1951 and his Juris Doctorate from St. John's
University School of Law in 1956. Judge Titone was appointed to the New York State Court
of Appeals by Governor Mario M. Cuomo in 1985.
Prepared with the assistance of my law clerk, Lisabeth Harrison (J.D., 1979, St. John's
University School of Law).
1 Herbert George Wells (1866-1946) was a renowned science fiction writer who imagined,
inter alia, space flight and time travel. See generally H.G. WELLS, THE FIRST MEN IN THE
MOON (Berkley 1967); H.G. WELLS, A MODERN UTOPIA (1905); H.G. WELLS, THE SHAPE OF
THINGS TO COME (1933); H.G. WELLS, TALES OF SPACE AND TIME (1976); H.G. WELLS, THE
TIME MACHINE (1963); H.G. WELLS, WAR OF THE WORLDS (Lou P. Bunce ed., 1956).
2 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
U.S. 1995 411 tbl.649 (115th ed.) (hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.) (listing
employment demographics from 1983 and 1994 for occupations including physicians, attor-
neys, and accountants which demonstrate increase in percentage of women, blacks, and
hispanics); see also BARBARA A. CURRAN AND CLARA N. CARSON, AMERICAN BAR FOUND., THE
LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s 1, 3 fig.2, 4 tbl.2
(1994) (graphing steady increase in number of female lawyers in United States from three
percent in 1951 to twenty percent in 1990).
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The graduates of the Class of 1956, who once trembled before
bar exam proctors, have gone on to become judges, high-powered
lawyers, business executives, law school deans, and, in one case, a
nationally-esteemed Governor.3 And, we now all have less hair,
less teeth, and more girth.
Most of the changes that have occurred over the past forty years
have been good ones. One change that is decidedly not for the bet-
ter, however, is the increasingly strident tone of our public policy
debate. Hate speech, ad homonym rhetoric, small-mindedness,
and mockery increasingly have replaced reasoned advocacy and
civilized debate.4 Instead of leaders who work to bring us together
and improve our common lot, we have politicians who can do noth-
ing more constructive than accuse each other of petty wrongdoing
and moral transgression.5 Instead of commentators and media
pundits who strive to inform and elevate the level of public dis-
course, our airwaves increasingly are filled with hucksters who
ridicule decency and champion intolerance-all for the sake of a
few rating points.
Nowhere is this pernicious, democracy-undermining trend more
evident than in the recent shrill attacks by certain elected officials
on courts and individual judges 6-what retired Third Circuit
3 See THE NEW YORK RED BOOK 22-23 (George A. Mitchell ed., 92d ed. 1993). Mario M.
Cuomo served as Governor of the State of New York from 1983 to 1995. He received an
LL.B. degree from St. John's University School of Law in 1956.
4 See, e.g., Joe Battenfield, 'Comback Kid' Stays Above N.H. GOP Fray, BOSTON HERALD,
Feb. 3, 1996, at 1 (noting Clinton decision to eschew campaign appearances to avoid polit-
ical "mudslinging"); Maria L. LaGanga, Iowans Trudge Through Mud to Reach Decisions,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 1 (discussing voter disapproval of harsh rhetoric by presiden-
tial candidates); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Closing Argument: 'Judge Frees Baby Molester' and
Other Exaggerations, TEXAS LAWYER, July 29, 1996, at 22 (citing first negative statewide
television advertising campaign on behalf of candidate for Georgia Court of Appeals).
5 See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FED-
ERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994) (discussing recent nomination and confirmation pro-
cess for high government officials and Supreme Court nominees). See, e.g., Alan Finder,
Candidates for Senate Use Truth, of a Sort, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at B6 (reporting on
vitriolic and hyperbolic discourse during 1996 New Jersey Senate campaign); Charles P.
Frend, What's New? Mud-Slinging is an American Tradition, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1988, at
C1 (describing vituperation in presidential campaign); Howard Kurtz, The Big Sleazy: Is
Clinton's Clan as Low-Rent as Reagan's?, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1995, at C1 (comparing
'sleaze factor" in President Reagan's administration to "character issue" in President Clin-
ton's first term); William Neikirk and Jacquelyn Heard, Clinton, Dole Speeches Visit Famil-
iar Campaign Themes: Republican Focuses on Character; Crime Tops President's Agenda,
CHICAGO TRIB., June 23, 1996, at 3 (comparing partisan rhetoric in 1996 presidential cam-
paign); Campaign '96: Election Night Special Report/Newscast (CBS television broadcast,
Nov. 5, 1996), available in 1996 WL 8018555 (describing New Jersey Senate campaign as
'nastiest political campaign this year").
6 See John M. Goshko, Accusations of Coddling Criminals Aimed at Two Judges in New
York, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1996, at A3 (quoting former New York City Police Commis-
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Judge H. Lee Sarokin referred to as the "Willie Hortonizing" of the
judiciary.7 Of course, no one would suggest that the judiciary
should be immune from criticism.' To the contrary, we in the judi-
cial branch welcome public debate about the soundness and direc-
tion of our decisions. 9 Such debate can be very constructive in elu-
cidating the underlying policy issues and in showing us where we
need to temper abstract legal analysis with practical wisdom.
There is, however, an important difference between constructive
substantive criticism and the destructive hailstorm of invective
that has recently rained down upon federal and state level
judges. 10
Particularly objectionable is the practice of some of our elected
officials of singling-out isolated trial court or appellate level deci-
sions as purported examples of the courts' so-called "coddling" of
criminals.1 There is little basis for the charge that our courts are
sioner William J. Bratton as stating "screwball Court of Appeals" is "living off in Disney-
land somewhere. They're not living in the streets of New York"); see also Henry J. Reske,
ABA Commission Defines Areas of Judicial Independence, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 99 (dis-
cussing many personal attacks on judicial decisions at state and federal level by politi-
cians); Gary Spencer, Pataki Asks Judge to Resign; Threatens Removal by Senate, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 23 ,1996, at 1 (describing Governor's exhortation to Judge Lorin Duckman to resign);
Gary Spencer, Protection Order Abuse Elevated to Felony, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1996, at 1 (re-
porting on Governor Pataki's charge that judges were "weak link" in criminal justice sys-
tem, particularly noting Judge Duckman's leniency); Today's News, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 1996,
at 1 (reporting anticipated commencement of Judicial Conduct Hearings concerning Judge
Lorin Duckman).
7 See Letter from Hon. H. Lee Sarokin, United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit to President William J. Clinton (June 4, 1996), reprinted in L. H. Pollack, Criticiz-
ing Judges, 79 JUDICATURE 299, 302 (May/June 1996); see also Henry J. Reske, Pointed
Resignation Judge Blasts Politicization of Judiciary, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 40 (reporting
United States Court of Appeals Judge H. Lee Sarokin's reason for resigning from Third
Circuit bench as motivated by fact that he had become "prime target" of politicians trying
to "Willie Hortonize" federal judiciary).
8 See Mark Green, When Politicians Judge the Judges, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1996, at 2 (dis-
cussing appropriate circumstances to criticize judges); see also Richard H. Kuh, The Impor-
tance of Being Critical, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1996, at 2 (asserting criticism of judiciary can be
used constructively to improve performance).
9 See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS'N., COMM. ON PROF'L JuD. ETHICS, Formal Op. 1996-1
(1996) (explaining parameters for public criticism of judges by lawyers).
10 See David N. Dinkins, Judicial System Under Attack, N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1996, at 2
(decrying harsh, inciteful rhetoric and criticism ofjudiciary); see also John Gibeaut, Taking
Aim, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50 (describing attacks on judges during recent presidential
campaign as 'scape-judging"); Carl Wisotsky, Attacks on Judges Tarnish Original Ameri-
can Dream, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1996, at S6 (referring to attacks by elected officials on individ-
ual judges and their decisions as 'judge-bashing").
11 See John Caher, Seven are Nominated for Opening on Court of Appeals, TIMES UNION
(Albany), Nov. 6, 1996, at B2 (reporting Governor Pataki "repeatedly characterized the
high court as a panel of criminal-coddling liberals"); see also N. Lee Cooper, Don't Let Politi-
cians Get Away With Blaming Judiciary for Crime Problem, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 6 (de-
fining "scape-judging" as "process by which one party uses anecdotes and particular cases
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havens for felons or, as one tabloid put it, "a court system that
criminals love."1 2 Those assertions are, at best, serious distortions
of the truth.1
3
The New York State Court of Appeals, which has been the sub-
ject of the most virulent attacks,14 has a lower rate of reversal in
criminal cases than the current United States Supreme Court.' 5
Of the approximately three thousand applications for leave to ap-
peal that we receive each year, a mere two percent succeed in hav-
ing their petitions heard.' 6 Of those, less than one quarter-or
one-half of one percent of the total-actually obtain reversals.
Overall, our prison population is the highest it has ever been and
every single inmate was put there by a New York State judge. 7
Further, those who select isolated decisions and hold them up to
public ridicule invariably fail to mention that judicial decision-
making is driven not by a judge's personal wishes, but rather, by
taken out of context to suggest that judicial nominees of the other party are 'soft on
crime'").
12 This was a NEW YORK POST headline-during the period when the Governor's criti-
cism of the Court of Appeals was at its peak. Cf., e.g., Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 87
(1995) (suggesting sentencing concessions in favor of criminal defendants lead to percep-
tion by public and state legislators of judges as "soft on crime").
13 See infra notes 15-16 (discussing low reversal statistics of Court of Appeals for crimi-
nal cases); see also Caher, supra note 11, at B2 (reporting "studies show the Court of Ap-
peals almost always rules in favor of prosecution"); Norman A- Olch, Soft on Crime? Not the
New York Court of Appeals, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1996, at 1 (describing attacks on Court of
Appeals as "unsubstantiated").
14 See Caher, supra note 11, at B2 (reporting Governor Pataki "repeatedly characterized
the high court as a panel of criminal-coddling liberals"); Goshko, supra note 6, at A3 (re-
porting remarks of former New York City Police Commissioner referring to "screwball
Court of Appeals... living off in Disneyland"); Olch, supra note 13, at 1 (quoting New York
State Attorney General Dennis Vacco describing Court of Appeals as "intent on coddling
dangerous criminals").
15 Compare STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 212 tbl.338 (listing cases
filed and dispositions from 1980 to 1993) with 1995 N.Y. CT. App. ANN. REP. app. 1, 4(B)
(noting 37 reversals for total number of criminal appeals and five percent decline in rever-
sal rate from 1991 through 1995 for criminal appeals with concurrent ten percent increase
in criminal appeals for same period). See generally Olch, supra note 13, at 1 (comparing
reversal rates of New York State Court of Appeals and United States Supreme Court).
16 See 1995 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. 3, app. 1(Z) (reporting total of 3,164 applications for
leave to appeal in criminal cases while granting only 89 petitions for leave to appeal in
criminal matters); see also Gary Spencer, Workload Increase at Court of Appeals, N.Y.L.J.,
May 20, 1996, at 1 (noting that 3,140 criminal leave applications were received by Court of
Appeals in 1995).
17 See STATE OF NEW YORK, 1995 COMMITTEE ON CRIME AND CORRECTION ANN. REP. (com-
piling crime and prison statistics); see also STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., supra note 2,
at 218 tbl.352 (reflecting general increase in nationwide prison population over years 1980,
1990, 1992 and 1993).
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controlling statutes or long-standing precedent.18 As Supreme
Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated: "Judges must do what
is legally right, even when the result is not one the home crowd
wants." 9 The failure to acknowledge that judges' choices are lim-
ited is especially reprehensible because most of the politician-crit-
ics have legal training2 ° and are well aware that judges are con-
strained by a complex set of rules and conventions, 2' many of
which are based on statutes that were enacted-and can be
changed readily-by elected, non-judicial officials.
It obviously does not serve the interests of those who trade in
sound bites to linger over these facts. Politicians looking for a
headline or a quick quote on the eleven o'clock news naturally pre-
fer to play upon the heinousness of the crime or the suffering of
the victims-"facts" which excite the public's passions, but which
have little to do with principled judicial decision-making in a sys-
tem that is based upon the rule of law.22
18 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (seminal Supreme Court case
defining role of judiciary).
19 See Clinton Nominates Ginsburg to Supreme Court, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., June 19,
1993, at 1599-1600 (transcribing Ruth Bader Ginsburg's comments on her nomination to
United States Supreme Court and quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist as stating, "[a] judge is
bound to decide each case fairly in accord with the relevant facts and the applicable law,
even when the decision is not, as he put it, what the home crowd wants"); see also N.Y. JuD.
LAW app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1 and 2 (McKinney 1992) (stating judges
should "avoid appearance of impropriety in all activities and conduct themselves in manner
in which integrity and independence of judiciary is preserved"); cf People v. Grasso, 162
Misc. 2d 84, 616 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1994) (noting "[llegal disputes
must perforce be decided upon sound legal reasoning and not influenced by pressure of
public sentiment").
20 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-6
(1994). This provision of the Code provides:
While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize [judges and administrative officials]
publicly, the lawyer should be certain of the merit of the complaint, use appropriate
language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements
tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system. Criticisms motivated by reasons
other than a desire to improve the legal system are not justified.
Id.; see also NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS'N., COMM. ON PRO'L JuD. ETHICS, Formal Op. 1996-1,
(1996). This organization condones a lawyer's criticism of a particular sitting judge only if it
is well-founded. Id. See generally Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Defending the Judiciary -
An Open Letter to the Bar, 38 N.Y. STATE BAR NEWS, MarJApr. 1996, at 1. The most vocifer-
ous "judge-baiters" include the governor, members of the legislature and various mayors.
Id.
21 See N.Y. JuD. LAW app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994);
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). See generally Robert F. Housman, The Ethical
Obligations of a Lawyer in a Political Campaign, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 3 (1995).
22 See Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 527, 535
(1996) (noting former President George Bush's campaign declared "the war on crime will
not be won until liberals stop coddling criminals"); see also Symposium, Foreword, Faults,
Fallacies, and the Future of Our Criminal Justice System, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 1
(1996) (opining politicians won elected offices in 1995 by "asserting a tough stance against
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Additionally, the kind of criticism that exploits fear and preju-
dice rather than educates is a particularly cynical and cowardly
form of demagoguery because its targets, the judges who wrote or
voted for the challenged decisions, operate under a strict code of
ethics and custom that prevents them from responding.2 3 Because
they are ethically prevented from making public comment,24
judges are easy prey for irresponsible politicians who would take
advantage of the immediate gain to be had from stirring up public
fears, thereby diverting the public's attention from the real causes
of crime in our society.2 5
On this point, I cannot emphasize strongly enough that we in
the judicial branch of government are not responsible for the oc-
currence of crime.26 We do not commit crimes and we do not have
the tools to prevent others from committing them. Those tools are
crime and against a system that purportedly coddles criminal defendants"); Green, supra
note 8, at 2 (outlining three principles for politicians who engage in criticizing judges); Jon
0. Newman et al., Second Circuit Chief Judge Criticizes Attacks on Judge Baer, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at 12 (stressing attacks on federal bench disserves Constitution and
creates danger of seriously misleading American public as to proper role of federal
judiciary).
23 See N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6) (McKinney 1992)
(stating that judges should refrain from commenting on pending or impending proceedings
of court); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3(B)(9) (1990) (stating judges shall not during pending or impending proceeding
"make public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its
fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial
or hearing...").
24 See N.Y. JuD. LAW app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(6) (McKinney 1992)
(stating "[a] judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending pro-
ceeding in any court", but "does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the
course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the
court"); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(9) (1990) (prohibiting "pub-
lic comments when they "might reasonably be expected to affect [trial's] outcome or impair
its fairness"); Marjorie E. Gross, Updated Rules on Judicial Conduct, N.Y.L.J., May 14,
1996, at 1 (noting state bar ethics committee retained "no public comment" approach of
ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct in order to maintain public perception of judicial
impartiality). But see People v. Lazzaro, 580 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (con-
cluding judge's comments in newspaper article explaining court procedure did not violate
Code of Judicial Conduct).
25 See STATE OF NEW YORK, 1995 COMMITTEE ON CRME AND CORRECTION ANN. REP. (com-
piling crime and prison statistics); see also STATE OF NEW YORK, JOINT LEGISLATIVE COM-
MITTEE ON CRIME, ITS CAUSES, CONTROL AND EFFECT ON SOCIETY (studying crime in New
York State from 1968 to 1973); Meredith McLain, "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Solu-
tion to the Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 124-26 (1996) (identify-
ing poverty, homelessness, and erosion of family as root causes of crime in United States);
Symposium, The State of Civil Liberties: Where Do We Go From Here?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 575, 624 (1992) (discussing how real causes of crime must be dealt with before
crime rates decrease).
26 See Reske, supra note 7, at A40 (quoting Judge H. Lee Sarokin's complaint that
judges' guarding constitutional rights of criminal defendants are seen as "being soft" on
crime or causing crime).
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held instead by the elected legislators, who have the authority to
prohibit misconduct and prescribe punishment27 and by the Exec-
utive Branch, which has the power to establish ameliorative pro-
grams, to initiate prosecutions, and to deploy police resources.28
Although, one would never suspect it from the prevailing political
rhetoric, the judiciary is not just another arm of the law enforce-
ment establishment and our role is not to prevent crime.29 Rather,
the constitutional duty of the courts is to stand as neutral arbiters
to ensure that all accused citizens are tried fairly and in accord-
ance with the law.3 °
In addition to distorting the import of our courts' decisions,
some of our elected officials have taken the extra-and even more
pernicious-steps of personally attacking our judges because of
particular rulings they have made.3 ' Some of these attacks have
been aimed at coercing a change of ruling.32 In one instance, a
27 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting legislative powers in Congress); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18 (declaring power of Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers"); see also N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1
(vesting legislative power in senate and assembly); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (declaring gen-
eral purpose of penal law is to "proscribe conduct" and "prescribe proportionate penalties").
28 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (vesting executive power of United States in President); see
also N.Y. CONST. art IV, § 3 (governor has power to "expedite all such measure as may be
resolved upon by the legislature, and take care that the laws are faithfully executed").
29 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that it is "the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton) (stating "the interpretation of the laws is one proper and peculiar
province of the courts").
30 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 (establishing and discussing jurisdiction of federal ju-
diciary); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-80 (explaining judicial review doctrine); see also N.Y. JUD.
LAW app., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (McKinney 1992) (stating "[a]n independent
and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society"); Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (discussing separation of powers and
role of judiciary). See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS (1925) (exploring role of judicial branch in democratic government).
31 See Gibeaut, supra note 10, at 50 (exploring political response to judges' decisions in
particular areas and addressing campaigns of critics to oust judges for unpopular rulings);
see also Goshko, supra note 6, at A3 (quoting Patrolmen's Benevolent Association represen-
tative stating that "[als long as there are judges like [federal judge Harold Baer, Jr.],
criminals will be running wild" and New York Governor George Pataki as describing New
York State Criminal Court Judge Lorin Duckman as "unfit to serve"); Barry Kamins, Set-
ting the Record Straight in the Friedman Matter, 38 N.Y. STATE BAR NEWS, Mar./Apr. 1996,
at 5 (discussing controversial decision by Kings County Supreme Court Justice David
Friedman); Roberta Cooper Ramo, ABA Members Who Shrug Off Attacks on the Judiciary
Endanger Democracy, A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 8 (addressing one political leader's criticism
of several judges' decisions and identifying critic's placement of judges in "judicial hall of
shame" as one of distressing attacks on independence of judiciary); Eugene P. Souther,
Taking a Close Look at the Facts in the Baer Decision, 38 N.Y. STATE BAR NEWS, MarJApr.
1996, at 4 (analyzing 'sharply criticized' United States District Judge's decision).
32 See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting
Government's motion to reconsider and reargue, concluding investigative stop of defendant
by police was valid, and reversing previous ruling); United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp.
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federal judge was hounded out of office,33 and in another, a public
official threatened to initiate legislative removal proceedings to
punish a state judge for an unpopular criminal ruling.34
Make no mistake, these posturings represent a direct and im-
mediate threat to the independence of the judiciary.35 As Yale
Law School Professor Robert Gordon recently observed, the cur-
rent trend "opens a new and dangerous chapter in the time-
honored political practice of judge-bashing."3 6 There is nothing
subtle or ambiguous about the aims of the newest breed of judge
bashers. They declare as their aim the removal or punishment of
those judges whose decisions do not please them or their political
adherents. Former District Court Judge Marvin Frankel recently
observed that these glib opportunists act as though they had
never heard of the Constitution. 7 Their rhetoric is all the more
232, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suppressing eighty pounds of cocaine and heroin found by police
in defendant's car because police lacked "reasonable suspicion" to search vehicle); Rocco
Cammarere, ABA Directs Aim at Bench-Bashing, N.J. LAWYER, Aug. 12, 1996, at 1 (sug-
gesting political denouncement and pressure led to Judge Baer's reversal of Bayless sup-
pression decision); see also Goshko, supra note 6, at A3 (reporting 150 congresspersons
jointly requested President Clinton to obtain Judge Baer's resignation); Preserving an In-
dependent Judiciary - And the Right to Criticize It, 2 N.Y. LITIGATOR 6, Nov. 1996 (hereinaf-
ter Preserving an Independent Judiciary) (highlighting instances when New York elected
officials severely attacked various decisions seeking change in disposition as well as Gover-
nor Pataki's threat to remove Bronx County District Attorney Robert Johnson concerning
his decision not to seek death penalty).
33 See sources cited supra note 31 (discussing politicians seeking federal judge's resigna-
tion and decision reversal); see also David E. Rovella, Judge Sarokin Decries Criticism of
Bench, Quits, NAT'L L.J., June 17, 1996, at A10 (suggesting that Third Circuit Judge H. Lee
Sarokin's resignation, due to political pressure, was unique).
34 See Spencer, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting New York State Governor Pataki's request
for New York State Supreme Court Justice Lorin Duckman's resignation after controver-
sial bail hearing); see also Today's News, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 1996, at 1 (reporting commence-
ment of Judicial Conduct Hearings concerning Judge Lorin Duckman); cf Gibeaut, supra
note 10, at 52 (discussing public outrage over Judge Duckman's decision in controversial
bail hearing).
35 See Preserving an Independent Judiciary, supra note 32, at 8-9 (citing New York State
Bar Association's Special Committee on Judicial Independence to balance constructive crit-
icism with effective role of judiciary); see also Henry J. Reske, Political Matters Heat up
Judges Conference, A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 110 (quoting various chief judges of United
States Court of Appeals for Second Circuit in their admonition that when judges are
threatened with removal or impeachment for rulings "the entire process of orderly resolu-
tion of legal disputes is undermined").
36 See Rovella, supra note 33, at A10; see also Seymour, supra note 20, at 1 (decrying
increasing practice of "judge-bashing" by elected officials).
37 See MARViN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT ORDER 104 (1973) (not-
ing that "our elected lawmakers, who are not less than the judges [are] bound by their
oaths to support the Constitution"); cf Harvey A. Silvergate, American Family Values,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 1995, at A23 (noting Judge Frankel's popularity for his civilized
approach).
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alarming because it comes from elected leaders who are sworn to
uphold that document.3
From Alexander Hamilton39 theorizing in the Federalist Pa-
pers,40 to Chief Justice Rehnquist 41 addressing a law school audi-
ence, 42 to our own New York State Court of Appeals Chief Judge
Judith S. Kaye43 speaking on the state of the judiciary,4 to the
twenty-six individuals and bar groups participating in a recent
38 See Marvin E. Frankel, Political Demagoguery Threatens Judiciary, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
15, 1996 at Al (suggesting requests by elected officials for Judge Harold Baer, Jr.'s resigna-
tion in response to unpopular decision oversteps their authority).
39 See generally 6 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAw 1 (West 1984). Alexander Hamilton
(1755-1804) was a lawyer who also represented the State of New York at the Constitutional
Convention. Id. Hamilton co-authored The Federalist, urging adoption of the United States
Constitution. Id. He served as the first Secretary of the Treasury in 1789 and was killed in
1804 during a duel with Aaron Burr. Id.
40 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Fear-
ing that the legislative or executive branch would impose its will on the judiciary and com-
mingle the power to create or enforce law with the judicial power, Hamilton noted:
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate
body between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts.
Id. at 467.
41 See WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAw 638 (9th ed. 1996). Chief Justice William Hubbs
Rehnquist was born on Oct. 1, 1924 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Id. He served as law clerk to
United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson from 1952 to 1953 and engaged in
the private practice of law from 1953 to 1969. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist was appointed
Assistant Attorney General by President Richard M. Nixon in 1969 and served as Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1971 to 1986. Id. He was sworn in as
Chief Justice on September 26, 1986. Id.
42 See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Joins Fray of Rulings, Defending Judicial Indepen-
dence, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al. Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to heated criti-
cism of United States District Court Judge Harold Baer, Jr.'s refusal to admit evidence and
a confession in a recent drug case, and stated that the Senate's refusal to convict Supreme
Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1805 still assures federal judges, "that their judicial acts-
their rulings from the bench-would not be a basis for removal from office by impeachment
and conviction." Id.
43 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAw 400 (9th ed. 1996). New York State Court of Appeals
Chief Judge Judith Smith Kaye was appointed to the New York State Court of Appeals in
1983 by Governor Mario M. Cuomo. Id.
44 See Judith S. Kaye, The U.S. Constitution: The Original American Dream, 16 PACE L.
REv. 471, 472 (1996). In her discussion on the independence of the judiciary, Chief Judge
Kaye stated that an impartial judiciary utilizes reason and principle, and not "privilege,
pressure or passion of the moment," as the basis for the resolution of disputes. Id.; see also
Gary Spencer, Kaye Warns of Attacks on Courts: Press Coverage Seen Harming "Confi-
dence", N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 1996, at 1. In her State of the Judiciary message, Chief Judge
Judith S. Kaye stated:
The role of the courts as impartial protector of individual rights can provoke contro-
versy, especially in 'hard' cases involving unpopular causes or litigants. Yet it is pre-
cisely because independent tribunals decide cases according to the law and not the
opinion polls that so many, including vocal critics, immediately turn to the courts for
protection and relief when their own important interests are at stake.
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joint statement,45 the responsible commentators are unanimous
that our free and democratic system of government depends di-
rectly on the existence of an independent judiciary.4 The judici-
ary must be free to rule on constitutional matters without fear of
removal for failing to swim with the prevailing political current.
Those who suggest that judges should rule with an eye toward the
opinion polls either misunderstand the fundamentals of our
checks and balances system or are guilty of a willingness to aban-
don that time-proven system in exchange for transitory political
gain.4 7 In either event, we lawyers and judges, as well as scholars,
historians, and all responsible citizens, have a duty to stand up to
these latter-day political bullies lest our fragile experiment in or-
dered liberty4" be torn down.
In the final analysis, those politicians who would beat the "law
and order" drum, do their cause no service by maligning or ridicul-
ing the judiciary. The judiciary stands not only as a bulwark
against oppression by the majority, but also as a powerful symbol
of our society's laws and rules.49 The effectiveness of that symbol
is diminished every time someone throws mud at a judge because
of a particular ruling. We can hardly expect would-be criminal
offenders to take the laws seriously when our highest elected offi-
cials treat those wearing judicial robes with such cavalier
disrespect. 50
45 See Daniel Wise, Twenty-Six Bar Groups Join to Defend Judiciary, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8,
1996, at 1 (pointing out that Joint Committee was formed to preserve independence ofjudi-
ciary while admonishing politicians for their attacks on this branch).
46 See, e.g., Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., 'Meddling' in High Court Noted, Not Approved,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 1987, at 12 (commenting on Chief Justice Rehnquist's statements con-
cerning presidential and congressional "meddling with court's independence").
47 See Gavel-to-Gavel Politics, THE NATION, July 1, 1996, at 3 (quoting New York State
Judge Burton Roberts responding to New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's criticism of
his rulings by stating, "[ilt was not incumbent upon me to poll public officials to interpret
the law for me or to guide me on how I should exercise my constitutional responsibilities
and judicial discretion").
48 See Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (declaring that federal
constitutional rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus should apply
to states through Fourteenth Amendment).
49 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 40, at 464. In a republic, the judiciary ob-
structs possible invasions by the majority on the rights of the minority. Id.; see also Gavel-
to-Gavel Politics, supra note 47, at 3. In the context of Judge H. Lee Sarokin's controversial
ruling, the article quotes Alexander Hamilton's statement that "[tihe complete indepen-
dence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential" to our constitutional system. Id. Fur-
thermore, " [ol n ly judges can protect individuals from an overreaching state, and minorities
from the tyranny of the majority." Id.
50 See, e.g., Steven Keeva, Hearings Will be Held to Determine Oversight Limits, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1996, at 110 (arguing that "scape judging" undermines integrity of judiciary and
democratic process).
MORE TEMPERATE DEBATE
I would like to conclude with the thoughts of my friend and col-
league, the Honorable Vincent R. Balletta, who served ably at the
Appellate Division, Second Department, and who died a few
weeks ago.5 ' In remarks made in connection with his receipt of the
Normal F. Lent Award from the Nassau County Criminal Courts
Bar Association, Justice Balletta said:
The presumption of innocence, the burden of the prosecu-
tion to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the defendant's right to remain silent-these are principles
emblazoned in our Criminal Justice System .... Other pro-
tections enjoyed by the criminal defendant have developed
through a long line of court decisions, often-times in response
to overzealous law enforcement officials, all of which has led
to the belief by many that the system is now slanted in favor
of the criminal .... [Iun a society which respects the rights of
the individual, ... [w]e seek to protect the innocent .... The
system has evolved so that the INNOCENT can live in peace
and quiet without the threat of unbridled police activity ....
However, we cannot protect the INNOCENT without bestow-
ing the same presumption of innocence and all of the other
benefits which we expect as citizens ... on the guilty as well
as the innocent .... If those who criticize the system would
think of themselves as being wrongfully accused, they would
then understand that we protect the guilty because we must
protect the INNOCENT.
There are winds blowing throughout our state and nation
calling for changes because [of concerns] about the growth of
lawlessness in our society .... We must be careful that the
strong voices clamoring for change do not result in the emas-
culation of the appropriate protections . .. that have made
this country unique ....
To Justice Balletta's thoughts I would add one final thought of
my own: Let all those who would deprive criminal defendants of
their constitutional protections be mindful that anyone may be
51 See THE AMERICAN BENCH 1625 (Laura E. Harris ed., 8th ed. 1995). Vincent R. Bal-
letta, Jr. was an Associate Justice, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second
Department. Id. Justice Balletta received his Juris Doctorate from St. John's University
School of Law in 1951 and served two terms as a New York State Assemblyman beginning
in 1967. Id. He was elected to the New York State Supreme Court in 1978 and appointed to
the Appellate Division in 1988 by then Governor Mario M. Cuomo. Id.
52 Hon. Vincent R. Balletta, Why Protect the Guilty?, Remarks upon accepting Norman
F. Lent Award from the Criminal Courts Bar Association of Nassau County, reprinted in
NAssAu LAWYER, Sept. 1996, at 1.
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found on the wrong side of the law. If the Constitution and laws
do not protect the most reviled criminal, you and I are also
unprotected.
